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The paper provides a comparative analysis of the association between student achievement 
and public-private partnerships (PPPs) in schooling across countries. Student-level data from 
the PISA international achievement test provides information on the public-private character 
of both operation and funding of each tested school. Across countries, public operation is 
associated with lower student outcomes, but public funding with better student outcomes. 
Thus, systems of PPPs that combine private operation with public funding do best among all 
possible operation-funding combinations, while PPPs that combine public operation with 
private funding do worst. The advantage of private operation is particularly strong in 
countries with large shares of public funding. 








Ifo Institute for Economic Research 








This version: January 13, 2006 
Paper prepared for the PEPG - World Bank conference “Mobilizing the Private Sector for 
Public Education”, Kennedy School of Government, Harvard University, October 2005. I 
would like to thank the participants of the conference, in particular the two conference 
organizers Raji Chakrabarti and Paul Peterson and my discussant Marty West, for very useful 
comments and discussions. A first draft of this paper was circulated under the title “Public-
Private Partnerships in Schooling: Cross-Country Evidence on their Effectiveness in 
Providing Cognitive Skills” as Harvard University’s Program on Education Policy and 
Governance Research Paper PEPG 05-09.   1
1. Introduction 
The issue of public-private partnership (PPP) is a much-debated topic, and increasingly so in 
the education sector (for examples, cf. Human Development Network 2001; Peterson 2003). 
However, given that PPPs are mostly either project-based endeavors or systemic features of 
whole education systems, evidence usually comes only in the case-study form (cf., e.g., 
World Bank 2004, chapter 7; Patrinos 2000, 2002). This paper, by contrast, uses the 
opportunities of internationally comparable data to provide cross-country evidence on the 
association between student achievement and PPPs across different countries. The PISA 
international student achievement study tested students’ basic skills in math, reading and 
science in an internationally comparable way. The PISA micro database is unique among 
recent international tests in containing information for each tested school both about whether 
it is publicly or privately operated and about what share of its funding comes from public and 
private sources. These data provide the opportunity of presenting “big picture” cross-country 
evidence on PPPs in schooling.  
Such an international perspective carries two particular advantages relative to analyses 
within a country. First, comparisons across countries allow for the recognition of systemic 
effects, in that the existence of private schools may affect the behavior and performance of 
nearby public schools. If public schools behave differently because there are private schools 
nearby, then there may be effects of private involvement even though the performance 
between individual private and public schools may not differ. Cross-country evidence can 
detect such systemic effects where both private and public schools may perform at a higher 
level because of the existence of private competition. The second advantage of cross-country 
evidence is that it allows analyzing possible differences in the effects of PPPs when they exist 
in different situations.  
In basically all countries, the ultimate responsibility and supervision of the school system 
remain with the state – whether the system makes use of PPPs or not. But beneath this state 
supervision, both the operation and the funding of schools may show differing shares of 
public vs. private involvement. If we think of school operation and school funding as the two 
broad tasks under consideration, and if we understand PPPs as any collaboration between 
public and private entities, then conceptually there are two specific ways in which PPPs can 
exist in the school system. In the first case, schools are operated (managed) by a public entity, 
but draw heavily on private funding – e.g., parents have to pay tuition fees. In the second   2
case, schools are operated by a private entity – be it a business, the church or else – but get 
most of their funding from a public entity – be it through base funding or vouchers.  
As Figure 1 shows, both forms of PPPs exist in a system-wide manner.1 In the first type of 
PPP, prevalent in the systems in the top left quadrant of Figure 1, the majority of schools are 
operated by private entities, but all schools receive the vast majority of their funding from 
public sources. This combination is given in the Netherlands, Belgium, Ireland and, to a lesser 
degree, in Denmark. The second type of system-wide PPP combines a high share of public 
operation with a relatively low share of public funding. This combination of private financing 
of publicly managed schools, depicted in the bottom right quadrant of Figure 1, exists 
particularly in Mexico, but to a lesser extent, it can also be observed in Italy, New Zealand, 
Brazil and Greece.  
Figure 1 depicts two more groups of countries that do not constitute partnerships between 
the public and the private, but are rather mostly private or purely public. The systems in the 
bottom left quadrant combine relatively low shares of public operation and public funding. 
This is true in Korea, where about half of both operation and funding is private, and to a 
lesser extent in Japan, France and Spain. Finally, in the systems in the top right quadrant, the 
vast majority of schools is both publicly operated and publicly funded. This is particularly 
true in Norway, Iceland, Finland, Sweden, Latvia and Germany. But actually, most countries 
have the vast majority of their schools both publicly operated and publicly funded. Both in 
terms of the share of publicly operated schools and in terms of the average share of public 
funding of schools, 20 out of 29 countries have more than 87% public involvement.  
This paper will analyze the efficacy of the four types of systems – private operation with 
public funding, public operation with private funding, substantial private operation and 
funding, and purely public operation and funding – in terms of student outcomes. While it 
will detect substantial performance differences between the different forms of systems, a 
quick glance at Figure 1 already reveals that a simple division between public operation and 
funding on the one side and private operation and funding on the other side does not seem to 
be fundamentally decisive for student performance. For example, two well-known top 
performers in PISA, Finland and Korea, characterize the opposite systems of sole public 
responsibility (100% public funding and 97% publicly operated schools in Finland) and large 
                                                 
1  Details on the data underlying Figure 1 will be provided in Section 2.2 below. Note that the specific 
subdivision into the four quadrants in the Figure is arbitrary, chosen in a way so that each quadrant has at least 
four countries, and is undertaken for purposes of visualization only.  
  



































Notes: Average share of public funding and share of publicly operated schools in the country, respectively.  
The acronyms stand for: AUT: Austria, BEL: Belgium, BRA: Brazil, CZE: Switzerland, CHE: Czech Republic, 
DEU: Germany, DEN: Denmark, ESP: Spain, FIN: Finland, FRA: France, GBR: United Kingdom, GRC: 
Greece, HUN: Hungary, IRL: Ireland, ICE: Iceland, ITA: Italy, JPN: Japan, KOR: Korea, LUX: Luxembourg, 
LVA: Latvia, MEX: Mexico, NLD: Netherlands, NOR: Norway, NZL: New Zealand, POL: Poland, PRT: 
Portugal, RUS: Russian Federation, SWE: Sweden, USA: United States. 
Source: Own calculations based on PISA micro database.    3
private involvement (51% private funding and 49% privately operated schools in Korea). But 
we will see that the more intricate combination of public and private involvement in the two 
forms of PPPs seems to have important consequences for students’ educational performance.  
While there are the discussed advantages of cross-country evidence, it also has 
shortcomings. Despite the extensive information on family and school background that allows 
accounting for other observable influence factors, thereby allowing comparing students who 
are equal in terms of other observable characteristics, the international student achievement 
test still provides observational data. In these data, private involvement is not randomly 
divided between a treatment group that has private involvement and a control group that does 
not have private involvement. Therefore, in contrast to randomized experimental evidence, 
the evidence presented in this paper has to be interpreted cautiously in terms of descriptive 
conditional correlations, which do not necessarily allow for causal inferences because they 
may also reflect effects of other, unobservable characteristics. Still, the multivariate analysis 
goes substantially beyond bivariate correlations in terms of detecting underlying relationships 
by disentangling these relationships from other observable influences at the student level. 
Furthermore, as will be discussed in Section 4.1, theory has some guidance as to which 
direction some of the main sources of potentially remaining bias in the presented “higher-
level descriptives” point, which can help in the interpretation of results. But ultimately, 
remaining bias due to selection on unobservables cannot be ruled out.  
While the paper goes into the question of effects of different forms of private involvement 
in some detail, it should also be clarified right from the start what the paper is not about. The 
topic of the paper is explicitly the effectiveness of PPPs in providing cognitive skills for 
students. Therefore, it does not deal with questions of efficiency (for which relative costs 
would have to be taken into account), nor with questions of equity of school systems with 
differing private involvement, nor with questions of the provision of non-cognitive skills. 
While it goes without saying that all these issues are of tremendous importance, they go 
beyond the scope of this paper.  
2.  Public and Private Involvement in Schooling around the World 
Before we describe the models and econometric evidence, this section provides some 
background on the international data as well as some more thorough descriptive patterns of 
public and private involvement in schooling around the world.    4
2.1  The PISA Database 
The database of the Programme for International Student Assessment (PISA) distinguishes 
itself from previous international tests by providing data both on whether individual schools 
are publicly or privately operated and on what shares of schools’ funding stems from public 
and private sources. PISA is an international student achievement test of representative 
random samples of 15-year-old students conducted in 2000 by the Organisation for Economic 
Co-Operation and Development (OECD). The study tested student performance in math, 
reading and science in 32 developed and emerging countries, 29 of which can be used in this 
paper.2 The OECD ensured a consistent and coherent study design and as much comparability 
as possible among the participating countries.3  
The PISA 2000 study had a special focus on the reading literacy of students, with a sample 
size of the database used in this paper of 130,242 students. The sample sizes in the other two 
subjects are 72,493 students in math and 72,388 students in science. In this paper, the main 
focus will be on reading performance – because of the larger sample size – and on math 
performance, which is generally viewed as being most readily comparable across countries. 
Also, math performance has often been found to be most strongly related to productivity (e.g., 
Bishop 1992). The specific student-level database used in this paper was constructed by 
Fuchs and Wößmann (2004), who provide more detailed information and notes on the specific 
database. They combine the test results with rich background information on students and 
schools from PISA background questionnaires answered by the specific students and heads of 
schools tested in PISA and with additional country-level data.4  
As a general background on the data, Table 1 provides descriptive statistics for each 
country on the level and variation of test performance in the three subjects. The test results 
were scaled on a score with an OECD mean of 500 points and an OECD standard deviation of 
100 points. In all data descriptions and analyses presented in this paper, only students in 
schools that had both data on private vs. public operation and on the share of private vs. 
                                                 
2  Among the PISA participants, Australia and Canada did not provide data on the public vs. private 
operation of schools. Liechtenstein was not included in the analysis because it features only 11 schools (with 
314 students), 2 of which are private, and because it lacks several internationally comparable country-level data. 
Data for the Netherlands are provided, although there is a caveat in that the response rate in the Netherlands was 
relatively low.  
3  Adams and Wu (2002), OECD (2001) and the PISA webpage at www.pisa.oecd.org provide detailed 
information on the PISA study.  
4  Fuchs and Wößmann (2004) also provide imputed data for missing observations, which are used in this 
paper with the exception of the data on private vs. public operation and funding, for which only original data is 
used.  
Table 1: Test Performance and Sample Size  
Math Reading Science    














 (A)  (B)  (C)  (D)  (E)  (F)  (G) (H)  (I)  (J) 
AUT  515  92 507  93 519 91 4,501 203  20  5.1 
BEL 520  106  507  107  496  111  6,345  203  149  4.9 
BRA  334  97 396  86 375 90 3,956 256  27  19.1 
CHE 529  100  494  102  496  100  5,830  269  26  4.4 
CZE  498  96 492  96 511 94 5,343 228  23  0.4 
DEU 490  103  484  111  487  102  4,442  192  8  12.4 
DNK 514  87  497  98  481  103  4,009  208  51  5.3 
ESP  476  91 493  85 491 95 5,818 174  65  6.4 
FIN  536  80 546  89 538 86 4,864 155  6  0.0 
FRA 517  89  505  92  500  102  4,080  153  36  12.7 
GBR  529  92 523  100  532 98 8,676 337  16  7.1 
GRC  447  108  474  97 461 97 4,305 144  5  7.9 
HUN 488  98  480  94  496  103  4,766  183  8  2.5 
IRL  503  84 527  94 513 92 3,793 137  83  1.6 
ISL  514  85 507  92 496 88 3,236 125  2  4.0 
ITA  457  90 487  91 478 98 4,704 161  9  5.6 
JPN  557  87 522  86 550 90 5,217 134  39  0.7 
KOR  547  84 525  70 552 81 4,676 137  64  6.1 
LUX 446  93  441  100  443  96  3,251  22  3  7.9 
LVA  463  103  458  102  460 98 3,038 123  1  22.0 
MEX  387  83 422  86 422 77 3,894 156  26  15.3 
NLD 556  89  530  91  527  96  2,246  89  66  10.3 
NOR  499  92 505  104  500 96 3,972 165  3  4.2 
NZL 537  99  529  108  528  101  3,456  144  7  5.8 
POL  470  103  479  100  483 97 3,586 125  5  1.9 
PRT  454  91 470  97 459 89 4,554 148  11  0.7 
RUS  478  104  462  92 460 99 6,566 242  0  2.0 
SWE  510  93 516  92 512 93 4,416 154  6  0.0 
USA 493  98  504  105  499  101  2,947  116  6  23.4 




Notes: See notes to Figure 1 for a list of country acronyms. 
a Percentage of observations without information on 
public operation or funding. These observations are not counted in the columns on sample size. 
b Sum.  
Source: Own calculations based on PISA micro database.    5
public funding were included. The sample size stands at an average of 4,500 students in 168 
schools per country.  
2.2  Differing Patterns of Public and Private Funding and Operation  
In the PISA database, data on public vs. private operation of schools comes in the form of a 
dummy that classifies each school as either public or private. In the school background 
questionnaire, a public school was defined as “a school managed directly or indirectly by a 
public education authority, government agency, or governing board appointed by government 
or elected by public franchise.” A private school, by contrast, was defined as “a school 
managed directly or indirectly by a non-government organization; e.g., a church, trade union, 
businesses, other private institutions.”  
Data on public vs. private funding of schools is recorded as the respective share of total 
funding coming from public and private sources. Heads of school were asked, “About what 
percentage of your total funding for a typical school year comes from the following 
sources?”, where the answer categories were “Government (includes departments, local, 
regional, state and national)”, “Student fees or school charges paid by parents”, “Benefactors, 
donations, bequests, sponsorships, parent fund raising” and “Other”. For the purposes of this 
paper, only the first category was classified as public funding, and the remaining sources as 
private funding.  
Descriptive statistics on the share of publicly operated schools and the average share of 
public funding in each country, already visualized in Figure 1, are provided in Table 2. On 
average across the 29 countries, 83% of schools are publicly operated, and the remaining 17% 
are managed by a private entity. But the share of publicly operated schools varies 
substantially across countries, with Belgium (25%) and the Netherlands (26%) at the bottom 
end and Russia (100%), Latvia (99%) and Iceland (99%) at the top end. The average share of 
public funding of schools across the countries is 87%, with Mexico (37%) and Korea (49%) 
at the lower end and Luxembourg, Sweden, Finland, Norway and Iceland all with a public 
share above 99%.  
From the perspective of PPPs, it is particularly interesting to note that the shares of public 
involvement in operation and funding can differ substantially within a country (column (M) in 
Table 2). At the one extreme, the public share is substantially larger in funding than in 
operation in the Netherlands (difference of 69 percentage points), Belgium (63) and Ireland  
Table 2: International Differences in Public Funding and Public Operation of Schools 
  
Average  
share of  
public funding 




Average share of public 
funding in publicly 
operated schools 
Average share of public 
funding in privately 
operated schools 
Difference
 (K)  (L)  (M)  (N)  (O)  (P) 
AUT 90.4  88.8  1.6  96.2  44.2  52.1 
BEL 87.5  24.6  63.0  95.1  85.0  10.1 
BRA 78.0  89.4  -11.4  87.3  0.0  87.2 
CHE 93.8  93.5  0.3  98.5  25.5  73.0 
CZE 94.9  93.9  1.0  96.2  74.5  21.7 
DEU 97.3  95.9  1.4  98.2  77.1  21.1 
DNK 94.3  75.5  18.8  99.9  76.9  23.0 
ESP 82.9  61.9  20.9  95.3  62.8  32.5 
FIN 99.8  97.2  2.6  99.9  98.3  1.5 
FRA 75.5  77.8  -2.4  77.3  69.1  8.2 
GBR 89.8  90.8  -1.0  98.7  2.2  96.4 
GRC 83.7  95.8  -12.0  87.4  0.0  87.4 
HUN 87.4  95.3  -7.8  87.9  78.3  9.5 
IRL 91.1  39.5  51.6  98.0  86.6  11.4 
ISL 99.4  99.2  0.2  99.9  40.4  59.5 
ITA 75.2  94.2  -19.0  79.2  10.1  69.1 
JPN 72.5  69.6  2.9  88.4  36.0  52.4 
KOR 49.1  50.6  -1.5  54.9  43.3  11.6 
LUX 100.0  87.9  12.1  100.0  100.0  0.0 
LVA 95.6  99.2  -3.6  95.7  89.0  6.7 
MEX 36.8  84.5  -47.6  43.6  0.0  43.6 
NLD 94.7  26.0  68.7  94.7  94.7  0.0 
NOR 99.5  98.5  1.0  99.8  82.3  17.5 
NZL 80.2  95.1  -14.9  83.4  18.4  65.0 
POL 92.2  97.1  -4.9  94.4  18.1  76.4 
PRT 87.9  92.7  -4.8  88.5  80.1  8.4 
RUS 93.5  100.0  -6.5  93.5  –  – 
SWE 99.9  96.6  3.3  99.9  99.3  0.6 
USA 91.6  94.6  -2.9  95.6  22.1  73.6 
Mean 86.9  83.0  3.9  91.2  65.9  25.4 
Notes: In percent. See notes to Figure 1 for a list of country acronyms.  
Source: Own calculations based on PISA micro database.    6
(52). At the other extreme, the public share can also be substantially larger in operation than 
in funding, as for example in Mexico (difference of 48 percentage points) and Italy (19).  
It is also revealing to look at the relative shares of public funding in publicly vs. privately 
operated schools in each country (columns (N) and (O) in Table 2). Thus, while in most 
countries publicly operated schools receive nearly all of their funding from public sources, 
56% of the funding of publicly operated schools in Mexico stems from private sources, and 
45% in Korea. On average across all countries, the share of public funding in publicly 
operated schools (at 91%) is 25 percentage points higher than in privately operated schools (at 
66%). The share of public funding in privately operated schools differs particularly strongly 
across countries, with the privately operated schools tested in Brazil, Greece and Mexico 
receiving no funding at all from public sources (and those in the United Kingdom only 2%), 
while privately operated schools in the Netherlands, Finland, Luxembourg and Sweden 
receive more than 95% of their funding from public sources.  
Even more striking is the difference in public funding that publicly and privately operated 
schools in a country receive (column (P) in Table 2). At the one extreme, the share of public 
funding in UK public schools is 96 percentage points higher than in UK private schools. This 
difference is also quite large in other countries, such as Greece (87 percentage points), Brazil 
(87), Poland (76), the United States (74) and Switzerland (73). At the other extreme, there is 
no difference at all in the share of public funding between publicly and privately operated 
schools in the Netherlands and Luxembourg, and the differences are also very small in 
Sweden (0.6 percentage points) and Finland (1.5).  
3.  Why Should the Public-Private Division Matter?  
Do these cross-country differences in public vs. private involvement in the operation and 
funding of schools matter for student achievement? From a theoretical point of view, positive 
and negative aspects of both operation and funding of schools by the state vs. the private 
sector have been advanced in the literature. The main case usually made in terms of the 
operation of schools is that private operation is more efficient than public operation because 
market forces create incentives for cost containment and performance-conducive qualitative 
innovation in private school management (e.g., Chubb and Moe 1990; Hanushek et al. 1994; 
Shleifer 1998; Bishop and Wößmann 2004). In accordance with this reasoning, empirical 
evidence tends to find that performance in privately managed schools is superior to   7
performance in publicly managed schools.5 Some of the empirical contributions also show 
that the existence of private schools improves the performance of nearby public schools that 
face their competition, an issue that complicates the empirical identification of the effects of 
private school operation and that we will come back to below.  
The case in favor of public provision of schools is less clear, if we separate it from the 
conceptually different case of public vs. private funding, in particular because the government 
could always write specific contracts with private providers to ensure that certain 
requirements are observed (cf. Shleifer 1998). However, one point sometimes advanced in 
favor of public provision is that only direct public provision of schooling could yield an 
inculcation of students with ideological and cultural goals and beliefs pursued by the 
government, a task that might not be easily contracted out to the private sector (e.g., 
Gradstein and Justman 2002; Pritchett 2003). Ideological inculcation may be an issue hard to 
pin down empirically, and it is certainly beyond the scope of a paper focusing on cognitive 
skills. But in a similar vein, direct public school operation might allow a closer monitoring of 
implemented curricula – although the incentives for monitoring may again be stronger in the 
private sector.  
In terms of the relative merits of public and private funding (as opposed to operation) of 
schools, it is sometimes argued that private or parents-based funding can increase 
accountability and provide incentives for efficient behavior from the demand side (cf. 
Jimenez and Paqueo 1996; Chubb and Moe 1990). It is not obvious, though, to what extent 
this benefit of private involvement would go beyond the benefit of private provision and the 
choice that parents can make between different private providers, which would already induce 
performance-conducive incentives from the demand side.  
This latter point can even be turned into the opposite case favoring public funding, if 
combined with the idea that some families may be too poor to choose privately operated 
schools if they have to be funded privately. As long as there are credit constraints that prevent 
poor families from borrowing against possible future income gains of their children due to 
improved educational performance (cf. Loury 1981; Galor and Zeira 1993; Gradstein et al. 
2004), poor families’ choices of better schools that require higher private funding will be 
                                                 
5  Important contributions to the empirical literature include Howell et al. (2002), Hoxby (2003a, 2003b) 
and Neal (1997) for the United States, Bradley and Taylor (2002) and Levaĉić (2004) for England, Sandström 
and Bergström (2005) for Sweden, Angrist et al. (2002) for Colombia, Cox and Jimenez (1991) for Colombia 
and Tanzania, James et al. (1996) and Bedi and Garg (2000) for Indonesia and Mizala and Romaguera (2000), 
Mizala et al. (2002), Sapelli and Vial (2002), Vegas (2002) and Hsieh and Urquiola (2003) for Chile. 
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constrained. Public funding can relax the credit constraints, which can allow greater choice 
for all families and therefore increase schools’ incentives to behave efficiently. The empirical 
evidence of positive performance effects of (mostly publicly provided) school vouchers to 
finance the attendance of privately operated schools (see references above) can be viewed as 
one aspect of this possible positive effect of public funding.6  
Given the different theoretical arguments as summarized in Table 3, we might expect the 
public vs. private nature of the operation and funding of schools to have an impact on student 
achievement. The direction and size of this impact remains an empirical question, though.  
4.  The Empirical Models 
This section describes the different specifications of the empirical model of the association 
between PPPs and student performance analyzed in this paper, and how they may or may not 
be affected by selection bias.  
4.1  Observables, Unobservables and the Possibility of Selection Bias 
Given the separate arguments for and against public involvement in the operation and funding 
of schools, assume that the true achievement model includes separate effects of operation and 
funding and can be represented by:  
  i i i s s i U B F O T ε β β β β α + + + + + = 4 3 2 1   ,  (1) 
where Ti is the achievement test score of student i, Os is a dummy showing whether the 
student’s school s is publicly (as opposed to privately) operated, and Fs is the share of the 
school’s funding stemming from public (as opposed to private) sources. B are additional 
background features that can be observed, like parent’s level of education, U are additional 
features affecting performance that remain unobserved, for example parents’ valuation of 
their children’s education, and εi is an error term.  
What are the consequences of B und U for our estimates of the association between public 
involvement and student performance? Two observations can help us understand the specific 
nature of one of the main sources of possible bias in our empirical models. First, given that 
we look at the effects of operation and funding separately, the arguments on credit constraints 
                                                 
6  A lot of the discussion of the relative merits of public vs. private involvement in schooling, in particular 
on the funding side, also surrounds equity rather than effectiveness outcomes (cf., e.g., Glomm and Ravikumar 
1992; Epple and Romano 1998; Nechyba 2000; Ladd 2002). For reasons of scope, in this paper we do not deal 
with the issue that public funding might serve to redistribute income or to raise opportunities for specific 
disadvantaged sub-groups of the population, leaving this important issue for future research.   
Table 3: Aspects of Public and Private Involvement in School Provision and Funding 
  Positive aspects of involvement of: 
  Public sector  Private sector 
Operation  Inculcation of beliefs  
and cultural values 
Incentives for cost containment  
and qualitative innovation 
Funding  Enabling choice for  
credit-constrained families  Increased accountability 
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discussed in Section 3 above bear on the association between family background and funding, 
but not on the private vs. public operation of schools. Second, families who can afford to send 
their children to schools that require large shares of private funding may tend to have other, 
often unobserved features conducive to the children’s learning. For example, they may show a 
greater valuation of educational outcomes per se, or they may simply use their larger income 
also to buy private afternoon lessons for their children if they are underperforming in a given 
subject. Therefore, the selection bias due to credit constraints would generally make privately 
funded schools look better than they really are. Thus, we would expect this particular source 
of bias to affect estimates of funding effects rather than operation effects, and we would 
expect this bias to point in the direction that publicly funded schools look worse than they are. 
In what follows, we depict these ideas more formally, before we go on to discuss other 
possible sources of remaining bias.  
Consider first the observable background features B. Following the above-mentioned 
theories of credit constraints, it seems reasonable to assume that B will be positively related 
with the share of private funding in the school, i.e. negatively related with F. Therefore, there 
will be non-zero elements in the covariance matrix between the B features and F. But if F’B ≠ 
0, estimating the effect of F under disregard of controls for B will yield a biased estimate of 
the true effect β2 of equation (1). However, given that we assume B to be observable, we can 
easily control for B in our regression, so that the estimated effect is no longer biased by the 
observables. This is the reason why we include an unusually extensive set of controls for 
background factors B in all our empirical specifications. Specifically, the control vector B of 
background data encompasses 60 variables, including 8 variables on student characteristics, 
28 variables on students’ family background, 14 variables on resource inputs at home and at 
school and 10 variables on institutional features of the school system.7 
                                                 
7  The 8 control variables on student characteristics are: student gender, student age and 6 dummies for 
grade level (ranging from 6
th to 12
th grade). The 28 control variables on family background are: 5 dummies for 
parental education (representing no education, primary, lower secondary, two types of upper secondary, and 
university education), one dummy each on the migration status of father, mother and student, 3 dummies on 
family status (representing whether the student lives with no parent, single father, single mother, or both 
parents), 3 dummies on parents’ work status (at least one half-time, at least one full-time, both full-time, 
reference category: none working), 2 dummies on parental occupation (blue and white collar), 6 dummies on the 
number of books at home, 5 dummies on the school’s community location (ranging from small village to huge 
city) and the country’s GDP per capita. The 14 control variables on resource inputs are: class size in the subject, 
educational expenditure per student in the country, 2 dummies on availability of instructional material (not at all 
lacking, strongly lacking), 3 dummies on teacher education (masters in pedagogy, teacher certificate, and 
masters in the respective subject), instruction time, 2 dummies on homework time in the subject (1-3 hours and 
more than 3 hours per week), 2 dummies on parental support (not at all lacking, strongly lacking) and 2 
dummies on computer availability at home (one computer, more than one). The 10 control variables on 
institutions are: external exit exams, standardized tests and 8 dummies on school autonomy in determining   10
Now, consider the unobserved background features U. If the covariance matrix F’U ≠ 0, 
estimating the funding effect under disregard of controls for U yields the following biased 
estimate γ, using the standard formula for omitted-variable bias (cf., e.g., Greene 2000, p. 
334):  
  () ( ) 4
1
2 β β γ ⎥ ⎦
⎤
⎢ ⎣
⎡ ′ + =
−
i s s s U F F F E   .  (2) 
Assuming for the moment only one unobserved variable Ui, we can also write:  









E + =   .   (3) 
This derivation allows us to pin down the likely direction of the bias that emanates from 
credit constraints. The estimate γ will be lower than the true effect β2 of equation (1) if β4 is 
positive and cov(Fs,Ui) is negative. And this is likely to be the case in this particular 
application. Let’s say that Ui is (unmeasured) parents’ valuation of education. Then β4 is 
positive, i.e. parents’ valuation of education has a positive impact on their children’s 
educational performance. And cov(Fs,Ui) is negative, because parents’ valuation of education 
is positively associated with their willingness (and probably ability) to provide private 
funding, i.e. negatively related to the share of public funding in their school. Therefore, the 
estimate γ will be a lower bound for the true effect β2. The larger the covariance between the 
unobserved features U and the share of private funding, and the larger the effect β4 of the 
unobserved features on student performance, the larger will be the underestimation of the 
effect of public funding. However, once we allow for multiple unobserved variables, the 
uniqueness of this result is no longer given.  
Note also that there may be other possible sources of remaining bias than credit 
constraints. Although credit constraints are often viewed as the main cause of concern for 
selectivity in education, other unobservable features may give rise to different kinds of bias. 
As one example, the selection may not only originate on the student/parent side, but also on 
the school side. If privately operated schools have more freedom to choose their students, and 
if the selected students have features unobserved by the researcher that differ from those of 
students in publicly operated schools, then this may give rise to bias also on the operation 
                                                                                                                                                          
course content, in choosing textbooks, in formulating the school budget, in deciding on budget allocations, in 
hiring teachers, in firing teachers, in establishing teachers’ starting salaries and in establishing teachers’ salary 
increases. See Fuchs and Wößmann (2004) for details.  
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side. For example, privately operated schools may have a preference to admit students who 
are particularly smart for their observable features, which would bias the coefficient estimate 
on O downwards. Moreover, in empirical applications that use variation across countries, 
there may be unobserved country features that are associated with the share of public 
operation and funding in a non-random way. Therefore, the extent and direction of any 
remaining bias must ultimately remain an open issue.  
4.2  Alternative Empirical Specifications  
Altogether, in this paper we will estimate six different versions of the basic empirical model. 
In specification (4), the variables on public vs. private involvement are measured at the 
country level and entered in a cross-country regression performed at the student level:  
  i s c i c c i B F O T ε η ν β β β α + + + + + + = 3 2 1   ,  (4) 
where Oc and Fc are the share of publicly operated schools and the average share of public 
funding of schools in country c, respectively. Both student test scores Ti and background 
features Bi are measured at the student level (the school characteristics in B at the school 
level), so as to yield as clean a control for other influence factors as possible. Note that in the 
empirical application, the error term will have higher-level components at the school and 
country level, whose implementation will be discussed in Section 4.3 below.  
The reason why we start with a cross-country specification with country-level public-
private data is the possibility discussed in Section 3 above that the mere existence of private 
schools in a city may have systemic effects due to their effect on how the public schools in 
the city perform, because these public schools are now faced with competition from private 
schools. Thus, looking at the simple relative performance of privately and publicly operated 
schools may well fail to observe the effects of the existence of the privately operated school. 
By contrast, such systemic effects will be captured in the specification that measures private 
involvement at the level of the country. The specification shows whether countries with a 
larger sector of publicly operated schools and with a larger share of public funding fare 
differently on average on the PISA test than countries with larger shares of private 
involvement.  
A second advantage of the specification is that it evades the problem of selection bias just 
discussed. While it may be the case that students whose performance differs for other reasons 
may select (or be selected) into private schools in non-random ways, such selection effects 
will cancel out at the country level. Under the quite confident assumption that there is no   12
school selection across country borders of an order of magnitude that might affect the 
presented results, any non-random selection would occur within the observation level of the 
public-private measures in specification (4) and would therefore not affect the estimates of β1 
and β2 in this specification. Note, though, that one can never perfectly rule out remaining 
endogeneity due to unobservables at the country level.  
Specification (5) simplifies the picture even further, by classifying the countries into the 
four quadrants of Figure 1 established by the shares of public operation and public funding. 
That is, public-private involvement will be measured just by attributing dummies to the 
countries whether they belong to the top left (TL), the bottom left (BL) or the bottom right 
(BR) quadrant of Figure 1, where the reference category is the top right quadrant:  
  i s c i c c c i B BR BL TL T ε η ν β β β β α + + + + + + + = 4 3 2 1   .  (5) 
This quadrant-dummy specification has the same advantages as the specification with 
country-level public-private data, only that it provides the results in an even simpler (but also 
coarser) way: Does the performance of the countries in the four quadrants of Figure 1 differ 
systematically from each other?  
Specification (6) adds an interaction term between public operation and public funding to 
specification (4):  
  ( ) i s c c c i c c i F O B F O T ε η ν β β β β α + + + + + + + = 4 3 2 1   .  (6) 
The coefficient on the interaction term (OcFc) depicts whether any effect of public funding F 
differs between countries with lower or higher shares of publicly operated schools.  
The next specification makes use of the individual-level data of public-private involvement 
in schools. That is, both public operation Os and public funding Fs are now measured at the 
level of each school s, still in a regression encompassing all countries:  
  ( ) i s s s i s s i F O B F O T ε η β β β β α + + + + + + = 4 3 2 1   .  (7) 
Note that Os is now a dummy representing whether the student’s school is publicly (as 
opposed to privately) operated, while Fs is the share of public funding of the school.  
In this specification, the considerations on possible selection bias now come into play, 
which suggested that one particularly relevant source of bias, due to credit constraints, points 
in the direction that the estimate β2 on the effect of public funding may be biased downwards, 
i.e. biased in favor of schools with larger shares of private funding. The specification can 
again be estimated with and without an interaction effect. In the specification using school-  13
level data on public-private involvement, the coefficient on the interaction term depicts 
whether any association between student performance and public funding F differs between 
publicly and privately operated schools.  
Specification (8) adds country fixed effects to specification (7):  
  ( ) i s s s i s s c i F O B F O T ε η β β β β α + + + + + + = 4 3 2 1   ,  (8) 
where αc is a country-specific intercept implemented by adding a full set of controls for 
country dummies. By disregarding any variation that exists between countries, this 
specification in effect estimates the average effect of public operation and funding within the 
countries in the pooled dataset. That is, the specification shows whether on average, publicly 
operated and publicly funded schools in a country fare differently from privately operated and 
privately funded schools in the same country. The previous considerations suggest that the 
relative importance of selection bias may get ever more severe in this specification, because 
the selection-free variation that exists between countries is now no longer considered.  
Finally, specification (9) estimates the same specification separately within each country c:  
  c i if B F O T c i s i s s i ∈ + + + + + = ∀ ε η β β β α 3 2 1 :   .  (9) 
By doing so, this specification can depict whether the within-country associations between 
public-private involvement and student performance are heterogeneous across the countries. 
The presented results on this specification will not consider an interaction term (OsFs), 
because initial experimentation showed that samples seem to get too small in most countries 
to properly identify the interaction effect within individual countries.  
4.3  Specifics of the Microeconometric Model 
As indicated before, the error term of the regression has a non-trivial structure because of the 
complex data structure produced by the PISA survey design and the multi-level nature of the 
explanatory variables. Given the possible dependence of students within the same school, the 
use of school-level variables and the fact that schools were the primary sampling unit (PSU) 
in PISA (cf. Adams and Wu 2002), the independence assumption usually made with respect 
to individual observations in standard econometric methods should be relaxed in favor of the 
assumption that only the variation between schools (PSUs) provides independent variation 
(cf. Moulton 1986). This is implemented by the clustering-robust linear regression (CRLR) 
method, which allows any given amount of correlation of the error terms within PSUs and   14
requires only that observations be independent across PSUs (cf. White 1984; Deaton 1997). 
For variables measured at the country level, we even allow for clustering by country.  
PISA used a stratified sampling design within each country, producing varying sampling 
probabilities for different students. To obtain nationally representative estimates from the 
stratified survey data at the within-country level, we employ weighted least squares (WLS) 
estimation using sampling probabilities as weights. WLS estimation ensures that the 
proportional contribution to the parameter estimates of each stratum in the sample is the same 
as would have been obtained in a complete census enumeration (DuMouchel and Duncan 
1983; Wooldridge 2001). Furthermore, at the between-country level, our weights give equal 
weight to each country. 
5.  Empirical Results on Public-Private Division and Student Achievement 
This section presents the empirical results on the association between PPPs and student 
achievement. It shows how student performance is associated with public vs. private 
involvement in the operation and funding of schools both across and within countries.  
5.1  Public vs. Private Funding and Operation Measured at the Country Level 
The specifications (4) and (5) that use only the variation between countries and disregard 
variation within countries by aggregating the measures of public-private involvement at the 
country level have the advantages of capturing system-level effects and of evading within-
country selection biases. Column (Q) in Table 4 presents the results of the quadrant-dummy 
specification (5) for math performance. This specification compares student performance in 
the four basic system types of Figure 1, with the type representing the largest number of 
countries, the top right quadrant of systems with large public shares in both operation and 
funding, serving as the reference category.8  
The results show that there are large and statistically significant systematic performance 
differences between systems that make strong use of PPPs and systems that do not. Systems 
with a relatively low share of public operation, but large share of public funding perform best. 
Their average performance is 37.9 PISA test-score points higher than the average 
performance of systems that are mainly publicly operated and funded. Given that the test 
                                                 
8  Note that given the somewhat arbitrary subdivision into the four quadrants of Figure 1, this quadrant-
dummy specification is meant as a depiction of a broad pattern only. It receives its validity only from the fact 
that the depicted pattern is vindicated by the richer specification reported below where public operation and 
public funding are entered as linear variables.   
Table 4: Public-Private Involvement and Math Performance across Countries 
  Country-level public-private measures  School-level public-private measures 
   (Q) (R) (S)  (T) (U)  (V)  (W)  (X) (Y) 
Top left quadrant  37.93
***                              
  (12.52)                             
Bottom left quad.  0.02                                
  (7.73)                             
Bottom right quad.  -36.64
***                              
  (8.17)                             
Public operation    -74.55
***       -93.80
*** -193.15
** -19.68
***     -24.69
*** -9.05 
   (14.78)      (13.81) (94.26) (2.40)     (2.69)  (5.98) 
Public  funding        24.51  91.05
*** 3.73       1.64  18.56
*** 30.18
***
        (26.69)  (27.03)  (77.00)        (3.53)  (3.96)  (6.40) 
Interaction                113.45               -20.37
***
               (109.86)               (7.63) 
Observations  72,493   72,493   72,493  72,493   72,493  72,493   72,493   72,493   72,493  
Strata                 29 29  29 29 
PSUs  29 29 29  29 29  4,870  4,870  4,870  4,870 
R
2  0.314  0.309   0.293  0.315   0.316  0.297   0.293   0.298   0.298  
Notes: Dependent variable: PISA international math test score. Least-squares regressions weighted by students’ 
sampling probabilities. Regressions include 60 control variables for student, family and school characteristics. Robust 
standard errors adjusted for clustering in parentheses (columns (Q) to (U): clustering by country; columns (V) to (Y): 
clustering by school). Quadrant dummies refer to country’s position in Figure 1. Interaction = interaction term between 
public operation and public funding.  
Significance level (based on clustering-robust standard errors): 
*** 1 percent. 
** 5 percent. 
* 10 percent. 
Source: Own calculations based on PISA micro database.    15
scores are scaled to have an international standard deviation among the OECD countries of 
100, the effect size can be interpreted as percentage points of an international standard 
deviation. That is, PPP systems that combine public funding with private operation perform 
more than one third of an international standard deviation better than pure public systems. To 
provide an alternative benchmark for the size of this performance difference, we can also 
compare it to the unconditional performance difference between 9
th-grade and 10
th-grade 
students (the two largest grades in PISA), which is 30.3 PISA test-score points in math.9 That 
is, 15-year-old students in public-funding private-operation PPP systems on average perform 
more than the equivalent of a whole grade level better than same-aged students in mainly 
publicly funded and operated systems.  
By contrast, students in systems that combine large shares of public operation with 
relatively low shares of public funding, i.e. the second type of PPP, perform 36.6 test-score 
points worse than students in purely public systems. Interestingly, there is no difference at all 
in the average performance of students in systems that combine large shares of private 
operation and funding and students in systems that combine large shares of public operation 
and funding.  
Figure 2 depicts the result pattern graphically. It shows that the two forms of PPPs – public 
funding with private operation and public operation with private funding – have diametrically 
opposite consequences relative to all-public or mainly-private systems. The performance 
difference between the two forms of PPPs adds up to 74.6 points. These results suggest that it 
makes a fundamental difference how the partnership between public and private in PPPs is 
conceived: Reserving funding for the public side but contracting the operation to the private 
sector brings huge gains in performance, but transferring funding to the private side and 
leaving the operation of schools in the public hand brings huge losses. The picture also 
suggests that there are no significant interactions between operation and funding at this level: 
Public operation has a negative effect, independent of the mode of funding, and public 
funding has a positive effect, independent of the mode of operation. Therefore, in a mainly 
privately operated and funded system, the two effects cancel out and average performance is 
similar to a mainly publicly operated and funded system.  
The basic pattern of results is exactly the same in the other two subjects, reading and 
science, as the results reported in columns (Z) and (AE) in Table 5 show. The size of the 
performance differences in these two subjects is somewhat lower, though, and there are slight 
                                                 
9  The values in reading and science are 33.2 and 32.4, respectively.   





















Notes: The distinction into countries with relatively low and relatively high shares of public operation and 
funding follows the quadrants in Figure 1.  
Source: Table 4, column (Q).   
Table 5: Public-Private Involvement and Performance in Reading and Science across Countries 
   Reading  Science 








  (Z) (AA) (AB) (AC) (AD) (AE) (AF) (AG) (AH) (AI)
Top left quadrant  28.28
**              17.00            
  (10.45)             (12.45)            
Bottom  left  quad.  -9.56             5.86            
  (6.39)             (6.61)            
Bottom right quad.  -13.06
**              -18.36
***             
  (5.76)             (6.53)            
Public operation    -56.95
*** -35.15  -19.27




    (10.71) (70.13) (2.30)  (4.88)   (11.86) (80.54) (2.42)  (5.01) 
Public funding    59.06
** 78.07  8.35
** 17.42
***  22.07  -90.88 0.79  9.39
*
    (23.62) (59.05) (3.29)  (5.37)   (20.49) (66.11) (3.36)  (5.24) 
Interaction       -24.80     -15.91
**          146.01     -15.11
**
        (84.64)     (6.30)           (94.11)     (6.41) 
Observations  130,242   130,242   130,242  130,242   130,242   72,388   72,388   72,388   72,388   72,388 
Strata           29 29              29 29 
PSUs    29  29 29  4,882  4,882 29 29 29  4,870  4,870 
R
2  0.310   0.311   0.311  0.306   0.306   0.254   0.256   0.257   0.252   0.252 
Notes: Dependent variable: PISA international reading/science test score. Least-squares regressions weighted by students’ 
sampling probabilities. Regressions include 60 control variables for student, family and school characteristics. Robust standard 
errors adjusted for clustering in parentheses (columns (Z) to (AB) and (AE) to (AG): clustering by country; columns (AC), 
(AD), (AH) and (AI): clustering by school). Quadrant dummies refer to country’s position in Figure 1. Interaction = 
interaction term between public operation and public funding. 
Significance level (based on clustering-robust standard errors): 
*** 1 percent. 
** 5 percent. 
* 10 percent. 
Source: Own calculations based on PISA micro database.    16
but statistically insignificant differences in the size of the estimate on the coefficient on the 
bottom left quadrant.  
The very same pattern of negative effects of public operation and positive effects of public 
funding emerges in specification (4) with country-level data on public-private operation and 
funding. As the results reported in columns (T), (AA) and (AF) in Tables 4 and 5 reveal, the 
coefficient on public operation is statistically significantly negative in all three subjects, and 
the coefficient on public funding is positive in all three subjects and statistically significantly 
so in math and reading.10 Note that the positive coefficient on public funding in math is 
significant only once the mode of operation is controlled for (compare columns (R), (S) and 
(T)).  
5.2  Cross-Country Regressions with School-Level Public-Private Measures 
Columns (X), (AC) and (AH) in Tables 4 and 5 report the results of specification (7) that uses 
individual-level data on public-private involvement, first without an interaction term.11 Note 
that the difference between this and the previous specifications is not in the level of 
estimation, because all specifications use student-level data on test scores and background 
features. The difference is in the level at which the measures of public vs. private operation 
and funding of schools are measured.  
The qualitative results of the specification measuring public-private involvement at the 
school level are the same as those of the specification with country-level public-private 
measures in all three subjects: Public operation is negatively associated with student 
achievement and public funding is positively associated with student achievement. As argued 
in Section 4.1 above, the selection bias due to credit constraints is likely to bias the estimate 
on public funding in the specification with school-level public-private measures downwards. 
However, we still get a statistically significant positive estimate. Therefore, the effect of 
public funding on student achievement seems indeed to be positive, and likely to be even 
larger than the reported coefficient estimates of this specification suggest. This pattern is also 
consistent with the relative size of the coefficient estimate in the specifications with country-
level and school-level public-private measures. The lower size in the specification with 
                                                 
10 The results on public operation are consistent with evidence from a previous international student 
achievement test, TIMSS, showing that student performance was superior in countries with a larger share of 
private enrollment and with a larger share of public funding going to privately operated schools (Wößmann 
2001, 2003).  
11  This specification and the results are very similar to those reported in Fuchs and Wößmann (2004). 
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school-level public-private measures could be attributed to the selection bias due to credit 
constraints, which is operative within countries but not across countries. But obviously, 
selection biases stemming from other sources may also be at play.  
The coefficient estimate on public operation is also smaller in absolute terms in the 
specification with school-level public-private measures. As argued above, theories of credit 
constraints would not predict a bias of the coefficient on public vs. private operation. By 
contrast, such a bias could, for example, be attributed to non-random selection of students on 
part of the privately operated schools. However, note that most standard versions of selection 
bias would predict a difference in the coefficient estimates of the two specifications that 
would go the other way, pushing the coefficient in the specification with school-level public-
private measures even more into the negative.  
In sum, all specifications that use the cross-country variation, both using country-level and 
school-level measures of public-private involvement, yield the result that public operation has 
a negative and public funding a positive effect on student performance. 
5.3  Interactions between Funding and Operation 
To see whether the effect of public funding differs under public vs. private operation of 
schools, the next specification adds an interaction term between operation and funding to the 
model. Columns (U), (AB) and (AG) in Tables 4 and 5 report results of specification (6) that 
adds the interaction term to the country-level measure specification (4). As already apparent 
in the quadrant-dummy specification depicted in Figure 2, there is no significant interaction 
effect in any of the subjects in this specification with country-level public-private data, which 
in this specification is mainly due to the fact that the estimates have large standard errors and 
thus lack statistical power.  
But the interaction results are different in specification (7) that estimates the interaction 
term on individual-level data on public-private involvement, reported in columns (Y), (AD) 
and (AI). In all three subjects, the interaction term is statistically significantly negative. This 
means that public operation has a slightly negative effect already in schools with low public 
funding, but this effects gets ever more negative with increasing public funding. This pattern 
is depicted graphically in panel (a) of Figure 3. The pattern might either be driven by 
increasing lack of accountability in schools that do not receive any private funding, or it may 
be driven by the selection bias of higher-performing students into schools with larger shares 
of private funding.   
Figure 3: The Interaction of Public Operation and Public Funding 







05 0 1 0 0
Effect of public operation on reading score
Share of public funding
 








Private operation Public operation
Effect of public funding on reading score
 
Source: Table 5, column (AD).    18
At the same time, the negative interaction term means that the positive effect of public 
funding is strongly concentrated in schools that are privately operated, while the effect of 
public funding reduces to about zero in publicly operated schools (cf. panel (b) of Figure 3). 
This pattern might suggest that it is particularly the role of public funding in allowing 
everyone – including low-income families – to opt for privately operated schools that drives 
the positive association between public funding and student performance. In this sense, public 
funding can enable more choice, in that families that would otherwise be credit constrained 
can choose privately operated schools if funding comes from public sources.  
5.4  Regressions Using Only Variation within Each Country 
Results of specification (8), which adds country fixed effects to the previous specification (7), 
are reported in the top panel of Table 6. An interaction term between public funding and 
operation was never statistically significant in the three subjects and was thus dropped from 
the specification. In this specification that disregards the between-country variation and 
exploits only the within-country variation, the coefficients on both public operation and 
public funding are negative, and the coefficient on public funding is the larger one in absolute 
terms. This might suggest that the association between public funding and student 
performance within countries is mostly driven by the selection bias of higher-performing 
children into schools with larger shares of private funding. However, this specification using 
the within-country variation in the pooled cross-country dataset also foreshadows systematic 
differences in the associations between countries.  
This becomes apparent in the lower panels of Table 6, which report results of estimating 
the model separately for each country, as in specification (9).12 We restrict our attention to 
reading performance here because the reading samples are substantially larger than the 
samples in the other two subjects, which becomes particularly relevant when restricting the 
estimations to within each country. It should still be recognized that in some countries, cell 
sizes get worryingly small, as is evident from the small number of privately operated schools 
in some country samples, reported in column (I) in Table 1.  
                                                 
12  Previous studies have estimated similar models of the effects of private school operation within several 
countries from international achievement tests, but without accounting for differences in the source of school 
funding. Thus, Toma (1996; cf. also 2005) estimates the effect of private school operation in five countries using 
the 1981 second international mathematics test. She notes that the positive effect of private provision is 
independent of whether the countries tend to finance the schools publicly or not. Vandenberghe and Robin 
(2004) estimate the effect of private school operation in eight countries in PISA, comparing several estimation 
methods that try to address selection bias, but disregarding the funding side of schools.   
Table 6: Estimations within Countries 
  Public operation  Public funding  Observations PSUs  R
2 
Pooled                  
Math -1.63  (2.45)  -10.63
***  (3.98)  72,493 4,870 0.346
Science -4.01
*  (2.32)  -10.51
***  (3.51)  72,388 4,870 0.281
Reading -5.99
***  (2.14)  -10.43
***  (3.52)  130,242 4,882 0.341
Reading                            
Top left  -13.66
***  (3.62)  -12.40  (11.02)  16,388 637 0.348
BEL -38.51
***  (7.07)  -0.17  (14.27)  6,345 203 0.506
DNK 5.94  (11.36)  -44.56  (42.58)  4,006 208 0.238
IRL -28.17
***  (6.18)  -16.86  (13.95)  3,791 137 0.330
NLD -9.91  (6.81)  -17.80  (35.79)  2,246 89 0.471
Bottom left  7.51
**  (3.40)  -5.75   (5.99)  19,773 598 0.331
ESP -13.05
*  (7.34)  -11.58  (9.52)  5,805 174 0.383
FRA 6.99  (4.75)  -3.18  (8.73)  4,077 153 0.494
JPN 36.29
*  (21.56)  -28.67  (18.40)  5,215 134 0.241
KOR 6.10  (5.67)  -12.04  (11.57)  4,676 137 0.261
Bottom right  -4.41   (7.78)  -13.88
**  (5.65)  20,284 861 0.418
BRA 15.11  (22.75)  -20.29
**  (10.01)  3,951 256 0.342
GRC -23.64  (17.23)  2.86  (16.66)  4,301 144 0.364
ITA 26.79  (19.39)  -56.49
***  (21.08)  4,704 161 0.356
MEX -32.26
***  (11.01)  -0.88  (6.12)  3,873 156 0.433
NZL -20.21  (14.80)  -68.81
***  (19.70)  3,455 144 0.294
Top right  -2.79   (4.73)  -11.12   (8.24)  74,022 2,795 0.319
AUT 14.60  (12.70)  -50.38
***  (17.32)  4,501 203 0.400
CHE -34.69
*  (19.14)  69.35
**  (28.05)  5,822 268 0.429
CZE -9.14  (12.19)  59.03
*  (30.20)  5,343 228 0.384
DEU -25.25  (20.40)  6.03  (54.93)  4,430 192 0.486
FIN -2.12  (11.11)  -238.14  (254.08)  4,863 155 0.221
GBR -83.86
***  (26.85)  -5.76  (27.73)  8,658 337 0.331
HUN -3.99  (12.55)  28.81  (24.81)  4,761 183 0.425
ISL -48.75
***  (17.90)  32.96  (24.56)  3,229 125 0.175
LUX 21.89
*  (11.29)  –    3,132 22 0.459
LVA -40.72
***  (13.41)  -20.17  (44.35)  3,037 123 0.315
NOR -35.83  (24.07)  276.67
**  (115.33)  3,967 165 0.182
POL -23.41  (52.29)  -24.23  (66.03)  3,585 125 0.290
PRT 4.83  (20.68)  -3.01  (10.43)  4,549 148 0.527
RUS  –    -5.81  (25.34)  6,563 242 0.279
SWE -10.32  (7.85)  275.32  (403.53)  4,415 154 0.209
USA -47.06
   (15.07)  11.81
   (19.04)  2,942 116 0.355
Notes: Dependent variable: PISA international test score. Least-squares regressions weighted by students’ 
sampling probabilities. Regressions include 60 control variables for student, family and school 
characteristics. Robust standard errors adjusted for clustering in parentheses (clustering by school). 
Regressions that pool countries control for country fixed effects. The organization of countries follows the 
four quadrants of Figure 1. See notes to Figure 1 for a list of country acronyms.  
Significance level (based on clustering-robust standard errors): 
*** 1 percent. 
** 5 percent. 
* 10 percent. 
Source: Own calculations based on PISA micro database.    19
A broad systematic pattern emerges when we look at the countries separately by their 
affiliation to the four quadrants of Figure 1 again. Running the pooled within-country 
regressions separately for each quadrant (again including country fixed effects), it becomes 
apparent that the negative coefficient on public operation in the specification pooling all 
countries is mainly driven by the countries in the top left panel, while the negative coefficient 
on public funding is mainly driven by the countries in the bottom right panel. All other panel-
wise coefficients are statistically insignificant, which may be partly due to a substantially 
smaller statistical power relative to the pooled cross-country analyses because of the smaller 
number of observations.13 Note that the lower performance of publicly operated schools in the 
top left quadrant is unlikely to be caused by credit-constraint-based selection patterns, as all 
schools in the systems of this quadrant – be they publicly or privately operated – receive the 
vast majority of their funding from public sources.  
By contrast, the lower performance of schools with larger shares of public funding in the 
countries of the bottom right quadrant may well be driven by credit-constraint-based selection 
bias. Nearly all schools in the systems of this quadrant are publicly operated, but rich 
families, whose children may perform better for reasons other than the public-private division 
of school operation and funding, can provide additional private funding for their schools. 
Finally, note that in the top right quadrant, there is a statistically significant negative 
association of student achievement with public school operation and a statistically significant 
positive association with the share of public school funding in several countries, as is the 
pattern in the specifications using the cross-country variation.  
Still, it should be borne in mind that the specifications using the variation within each 
country face the fundamental problem of selection bias. In particular, credit constraints might 
be expected to bias the estimates on public funding in the negative direction.  
6. Conclusion 
This paper has presented cross-country evidence on the effectiveness of public-private 
partnerships (PPPs) in providing cognitive skills to students. The main result is that across 
countries, public operation of schools is negatively associated with student performance in 
math, reading and science, while public funding of schools is positively associated with 
student performance in the three subjects. This suggests that school systems based on PPPs in 
                                                 
13  The positive coefficient on public operation in the bottom left quadrant is driven by the highly imprecise 
estimate in Japan.    20
the sense that the state finances schools but contracts their operation out to the private sector 
are the most effective school systems. By contrast, school systems based on PPPs in the sense 
that they require a lot of private funding but keep the operation of schools in the public sector 
fare even worse than systems where operation and funding is either both public or both 
private. Thus, the results favor the particular form of educational PPPs where the state does 
the funding and the private sector runs the schools.  
While this paper has looked at the relative effectiveness of PPPs in providing cognitive 
skills, aspects of efficiency, equity and non-cognitive skills have been left for future research. 
To look at the relative efficiency of PPPs, defined in terms of output per input, one would 
have to add a comparison of the costs at which PPPs operate relative to mere-public or mere-
private schools. If the different systems show systematic differences in their spending levels, 
then effectiveness is only one side of efficiency (note, though, that the reported results 
condition on several measures of resource inputs). It would also be interesting to analyze 
whether the effect of PPPs differs for students from different parts in the performance 
distribution, i.e. whether the effects are heterogeneous between elite and disadvantaged 
students. Specifications that interact the public-private measures with family-background 
measures could also provide evidence on equity aspects of private involvement. It also 
remains an open issue whether and how PPPs affect the non-cognitive skills, behaviors and 
beliefs of students.  
Another road for future research would be to look at the different channels through which 
the effects of PPPs may come about. For example, PPPs may differ from other schools in the 
education level of the teachers that they hire or in the autonomy that they are granted in 
different areas, and one may get glimpses of the importance of these different channels by 
comparing the presented results to regressions that do not control for these other aspects of 
educational production. Finally, countries differ in the extent to which they impose 
government restrictions on private schools, and such regulation may limit the extent to which 
PPPs are allowed to differ from public schools.    21
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